The Real Story of the American Revolution
Sponsored by the Sons of the American Revolution

How Global Conflict Influenced the Outcome  
of the American War for Independence
and Postwar World Development

=== Part 1 of 2 ===

The Effect of the U. S. Victory at Saratoga Few Americans saw with greater clarity than George Washington how the future of the nation lay in sea power. For without access to the sea there would be no arms and supplies, no markets and access to worldly goods through trade. No one courted more avidly the representatives of France and Spain than did Washington, for these countries had enough seapower to divert Britain into global conflict away from the local land conflict of the thirteen colonies. The Battle of Saratoga (Sep 1777) convinced France the colonies could win. For over a year France (in a secret 50-50 partnership with Spain) had been covertly supplying the Americans with arms - 164 cannon, 37,000 guns, 4,000 tents, etc. France formally recognized the U. S. as a nation by signing a treaty of Friendship and Trade on 6 Feb 1778, as well as a secret military treaty. An (undeclared) war with Britain soon erupted, and Britain immediately changed her priorities to reflect the new reality. Protect the homeland from invasion. Protect the sugar islands and timber resources of the West Indies. Restore the 13 colonies to British sovereignty. Hold Gibraltar and Mediterranean sea bases. Advance British interests in other areas. Britain aligned her available forces in the Western Hemisphere by pulling General Clinton back from Philadelphia to New York so she could send 5000 of Clinton's troops to take the initiative in the West Indies. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (see endnote 2), "This fact shows how the French alliance had changed the nature of the war. It now became to a large extent a contest between the two navies (e. g., British and French), the principal evolutions of which occurred in West Indian and European seas." Perhaps the statement could be improved from the French perspective if the Indian Ocean were added. Certainly the result was much of what George Washington had hoped for. Britain Wins the First Sea Battles Of course, George Washington gained maneuver room; but it also gave the West Indies commanders the forces needed to capture the port of St Lucia on 30 Dec 1778. With this naval base thirty miles from the French base at Fort Royal, Britain could monitor French naval activities in the West Indies. In protecting its homeland, Britain relied on its navy; and the first engagement was at Ushant, just off the coast of France. The British forces met the French forces and fought an inconclusive engagement on 27 Jul 1778, though each side claimed victory. What it actually did was to cause the French to pause in their aim to conquer Britain with land forces. They realized after Ushant that the British navy would fight any invading force every step of the way. The British had met their first challenge to the homeland, and they kept the initiative afterwards. The French ambition to invade Britain did not die for immediately, but each time the French put out feelers, the British were waiting. The concentration of British seapower near the British Isles did allow greater access by other ships to the southern route to the West Indies, then northward to the United States. The French were committed to aid America and sent an Expeditionary fleet under Admiral Count d'Estaing on 12 April 1778 to that end. This fleet arrived at the Delaware River too late to stop General Clinton on his way back to New York. Then it went on to New York, but it would not enter the harbor to attack. It did engage the British at sea near Newport, but bad weather hampered operations. D'Estaing went on to Boston to refit and repair, having achieved neither American nor French objectives. Then he moved on to the West Indies where France had real interests. He arrived too late to prevent the capture of St Lucia, and he failed in his attempt to recapture it. He fought several inconclusive naval engagements, then captured the non-strategic island of Grenada. From there he decided to intervene again in the American colonies at Savannah, Georgia, which the British had captured and fortified. He led a land and sea force to Savannah, joined with American forces, and laid siege to it in Sep 1779. British regulars and Loyalist units made a brilliant defense and soundly defeated both Americans and French in Oct 1779. Admiral d'Estaing sent the West Indies troops back to their bases and took his own fleet to France. Britain gained considerably in her second and third priorities as a result of d'Estaing's activities. Welcome Help from Spain and India Sultan France as a member of the Bourbon Alliance with Spain encouraged that country to enter the war. In the 12 Apr 1779 secret Convention of Aranjuez, the conditions for Spain's entry were established. As summarized by historian Jonathan R. Dull in his book, The French Navy and American Independence, page 142, this Convention activated the articles of the Bourbon Family Compact relating to mutual assistance in case of war. It contained an article relating to mutual assistance for the invasion of Britain in accordance with the operational plans then held in France. Spain promised not to make a separate peace, recognizing France's obligation to the American colonies not to make peace unless American independence was secured. Then Dull continues, page 143, "The critical section of the convention related to the war aims of the Bourbons. Spain and France promised not to end the war until the former had obtained the restitution of Gibraltar and the latter the abrogation of the restrictions placed in 1763 upon fortifying Dunkirk. Floridablanca (the Spanish negotiator) tried unsuccessfully to insert the capture of Minorca and the Atlantic coast of Florida into the category of absolute preconditions for peace. Each power then announced its other war goals. France announced her intention to acquire the expulsion of the British from Newfoundland, freedom of commerce and the right to fortify her trading posts in India, the recovery of Senegal, the retention of Dominica, and the rectification of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), governing commercial relations with Britain. Spain announced her intention to obtain the reacquisition of East and West Florida, the expulsions of the English from their illegal settlements on the Bay of Honduras, the revocation of English timber rights on the coast of Campeche, and the restitution of Minorca." (see endnote 3) When the naval and army needs for each objective ot the Convention are considered, it is clear that it was a Europe-centered approach to the war. The United States was not directly mentioned. The plans to invade England were a central feature and had been drawn up by French officials Sartine and Montbarey, and had been ready since 19 March, with 20,000 troops to occupy the Isle of Wight and subsequently to land at Gosport from which the Portsmouth naval arsenal and hopefully the British fleet could be destroyed by mortar fire. Vergennes hoped the transports and supply ships could be collected by the end of May. Spain was to pay for the invasion. The Irish nationalists were extremely interested in invading Britain, and both Spain and France had Irish Regiments which would have been enthusiastic participants. Various French generals, including Lafayette, sought command of the invasion force. It was to be a quick and decisive stroke, BUT: Dull notes, page 134. "Since to attack England would require 70,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, Vergennes (the leading French minister) suggested instead to attack Ireland with 27,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, half to be provided by each country. Vergennes expected the Irish, particularly the Irish Presbyterians with their passion of democracy, to rise against the English…." When the Spanish made clear they would not provide troops, but only limited naval support, Vergennes began to consider alternative invasion plans. This went on all through the summer of 1779. One plan after another was studied and put on hold. The situation was finally resolved in August, 1779, when the combined French and Spanish fleet could not find and destroy the English fleet protecting the British Isles, such destruction being the prerequisite for invasion. The troops waiting to attack had to go on to other missions. Though Britain did not know it at the time, it gained its first priority objective in August, 1779. The French minister, Vergennes, gradually moved the focus of the war to the Western Hemisphere, though the terms of the Convention were not changed. Other hostlities by Spain began immediately at sea, in West Florida, and in Central America. Greatest successes were achieved by Governor Bernardo de Gálvez of Louisiana, who captured Baton Rouge in 1779, then Mobile in 1780, then focused on Pensacola in 1781. In 1780, Spain sent an army of 10,000 men to the West Indies to support its activities there. Its main effort, however, was in the Mediterranean, where it recaptured the Mallorcas and laid siege to Gibraltar. When the news of war with France reached India in 1778, the British authorities there moved against the French installations with the intent of eliminating the French presence in India. They captured Pondicherry in the Bay of Bengal in 1778. Their taking of the French port of Mahé on the Western shore of India alarmed the Sultan of Mysore, and he declared war on the British in July 1780. This diverted the British efforts for some time until the Sultan could be neutralized. In 1781, both France and Britain sent fleets to India to protect their individual interests, as explained below. The Netherlands Takes a Beating Under the guise of free trade, the Netherlands had been involved from the beginning in clandestine support of the Americans. Her island port of St Eustatius in the West Indies was the world's busiest port in 1778 and 1779, handling the majority of supplies and arms bound for the United States. Britain was determined to shut it down. When the British ministries learned on 16 Dec 1780 that the United Provinces of the Netherlands had resolved to join, without delay, the Armed Neutrality Pact with Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and Italy, Britain sent orders for Admiral Rodney to seize the Dutch West Indies and South American possessions, and similar orders were sent to the East Indies. The Ambassador at the Hague was recalled. On 20 Dec 1780, Britain declared war on the Netherlands. Admiral Rodney captured St Eustatius on 3 Feb 1781, and captured or neutralized all other Dutch outlets in the West Indies and in Surinam. (He actually captured 130 merchantmen in the port, including one Dutch frigate. He also captured a Dutch warship with a convoy of Dutch ships which had just left. He left the Dutch flag flying for more than a month after the surrender, and captured 50 more American ships loaded with tobacco. A convoy from Guadeloupe was brought in. This gave him several thousand prisoners, with which he filled all the available space in Barbados and Jamaica. Likely, he converted some of the merchantmen into prison ships. For many months later, almost every armed ship going to New York, Halifax, and the British Isles had its contingent of prisoners. In August, 1781 the Dutch fleet was defeated at Dogger Bank in the English Channel, and the Netherlands was unable to protect her overseas possessions either in the Dutch East Indies on in the West Indies. The Netherlands became the heaviest loser of the war in terms of net loss per citizen. As the American naval historian, Mahan, noted: "The principal effect, therefore, of the Armed Neutrality, upon the war was to add the colonies and commerce of Holland to the prey of English cruisers." Continue to Part 2 Endnotes for Part 1  As author, I wish to acknowledge very useful comments from fellow members of the Sons of the American Revolution, Jacques de Trentinian and Albert D. McJoynt, who certainly does not agree with all my conclusions or even with many of my statements of fact. 1. Before preparing the essay above, My daughter N. C. Hough and I wrote eight books, each of which is complete with references. The general title is "Spain's {Borderland area} Patriots in its 1779-1783 War with England - During the American Revolution" (Society of Hispanic History & Ancestral Research Press, Midway City, CA 92655). For full title replace {Borderland area} with the name below and note the publication date: California, Part 1, 1998; California, Part 2, 1999; Arizona, 1999; New Mexico, 1999; Texas, 2000; Louisiana, 2000; West Indies (2001), this book includes Spanish, French; Dutch, and American Patriots); and Northern New Spain - From South of the U. S. Border, 2001. As we cannot travel, we exhausted the lending libraries of the National Genealogical Society and the New England Historical and Genealogical Society, then settled for one reference per week of interlibrary loans for items not in the lending libraries. We went through everything indexed for the Orange County (CA) Public Library System, The Library for the University of California, Irvine, and the Saddleback College Library (Mission Viejo, CA). We used the resources of the Family History Center, Salt Lake, UT, through its Mission Viejo facility to find the service records for Spanish soldiers who served during the war period and later. Through the internet we studied summaries of several thousand files in the Documentary Relations of the Southwest, University of Arizona, Tucson. We studied the holdings of the History Institute of the Army War College to see if we missed anything. We purchased books not otherwise available. We know we have learned a bit about the people who fought against Britain. We also know that American historians and histories are ignorant or mute on three significant aspects of the war: (1) that the aid France gave America beginning in 1776 and continuing until Spain entered the war was paid for 50/50 by Spain; (2) that the military and naval actions of Chesapeake Bay/Yorktown and subsequently in the Western Hemisphere were the product of the "de Grasse-Saavedra Convention," and (3) that the primary source of funding for Spain, and indirectly to France and America, were the "treasure ships" from Spanish America, the product of work by the peoples from the West Indies through the Philippines and in South America. Without these treasure ships, and the work of those Hispanic peoples providing the treasures, there would have been no funding, no support, probably no successful Revolution. 2. The Encyclopaedia Britannica in any edition is good for general discussions of the Revolutionary War as seen by the majority of its fighters, namely, Europeans of English, French, Dutch, Swedish and Spanish nationalities and of their subjects or allies in West Indies and Spanish America and India. Most articles are substantially accurate in most editions, though historians may prefer more exact works. We used the 1955 edition which is at least representative of the point we are making in the quote. We find few historians who disagree with the quote. What we do find are objections to wording of the recommended reading sections "American Revolution, The (1775-1781)" (Vol 1:795-801), "Great Britain" and "Defense:Army" Vol 10:679 and 688, and "United States of America," Vol 22:786-787. Perhaps these objections to the wording are the best recommendations for reading them. 3. Dull, Jonathan R., The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1975. Some historians have endeavored to show that a French invasion of England was a Spanish pre-condition to entering the war which was set at the Convention of Aranjuez. Dull makes clear this was not the case. The planning in France was already complete at that time. Spain merely signed on at Aranjuez to support it. Dull devotes two chapters to this subject. In the preliminary discussions leading up to the Convention of Aranjuez, Floridablanca encouraged a Europe-focused approach to the war, with an invasion of England a central part. This would draw English forces away from the over-extended Spanish empire. France seemed very interested in invading England, and completed planning to do so. After the Convention of Aranjuez was agreed to, the costs of such an invasion began to emerge. Further, in the summer of 1779, Spain made clear it would provide no troops and only limited naval support. Then in August, 1779, the combined French and Spanish naval forces could not even find the defending British fleet, let alone defeat them. Then Vergennes abandoned the English invasion and began to move the focus of the war to the Western Hemisphere, while concentrating in Europe on capturing convoys, which would effectively place economic pressure on England. Another interesting point about the early French-Spanish negotiations was that Floridablanca in 1777 would not even begin serious discussions on entering the war until the "treasure ships" were safely in Spanish ports. While Dull seems to indicate this was a matter of recovering the battleships convoying the treasure ships, it seems just as likely it was for getting the funds in hand for running the Spanish government and supporting any war effort.

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